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ARTICLES
Dangerous Games and the
Criminal Law
DANIEL B. YEAGER
A man's relation to his own acts is quite different from his relation to the acts of other people.'
I Introduction
This essay means to correct the ways in which the law of
homicide deals with lucky winners or survivors of dan-
getous games that end in the deaths of unlucky (dead)
"losers" or even unluckier non-participants. Drag rac-
ing and Russian roulette are my focus, not only because
they are so frequently litigated, but also because most
other (unlawful) excessive risk-taking ventures are not,
grammatically, what we mean when we say "game."2 It
is not so much my intention to evaluate the role that
"moral luck" plays generally in the world or specifically
in the criminal law.3 It is my position that in the notori-
ous risk-versus-harm debate, harm or consequences
should always matter in assessments of blameworthiness
-- that is, those would-be wrongdoers who "luck out"
and cause no harm or less harm than they set out to are
less deserving of blame than are those criminals who
accomplish what they put themselves to. Within the
confines of that debate, my point here is self-consciously
narrow: that while lucky survivors of dangerous games
may well be in a sense responsible for the death of co- or
non-participants, winning at drag racing or Russian rou-
lette is not, except under the greediest notions of causal-
ity or complicity, an instance of homicide unless the
survivor coerces, bumps,4 manipulates,' or otherwise
"helps" the killer's deadly actions.
So just how are lucky survivors of dangerous games
responsible for what they have done if they have killed
no one? Quite simply by their having to accept the
consequences of their actions, even though by pleading
Daniel B. Yeager is Professor, California Western School of
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justification or excuse (including lack of causality) they
often have a way of getting out of being held responsible.
For example, when in practice, Los Angeles Clippers'
star basketball player Danny Manning blew out his knee
when he inadvertently stepped on teammate Joe Kleine's
foot, Kleine felt terrible.6 Kleine's massive dose of "agent-
regret" persisted even though it was not really Kleine's
fault--after all, he was just standing there. But Kleine
was quite human to feel regretful when he linked
Manning's injury with his own (passive) role in the
episode. Was he responsible for what happened? Partly,
at least. Who else, if not him? Will we hold him respon-
sible? No; we exculpate him because at worst he was
clumsy, which makes him not blameworthy, though he
may never forgive himself for having played some role in
the suffering of another.
A merely clumsy agent lacks awareness of the exces-
sive nature of his risk-taking. Awareness of what one is
doing normally is a necessary and sometimes sufficient
condition of criminal responsibility. In those instances,
when an agent is more than clumsy-when he is aware
of or indifferent to the risks he poses to persons or their
property, even when he causes no palpable harm-there
are offenses that make him criminally responsible solely
for the threat or danger he poses. Reckless endanger-
ment,7 solicitation,8 conspiracy,9 orthodox conceptions
of attempt," possessory offenses," dilute forms of as-
sault, 2 perhaps even burglary,13 to name a few, 4 are
crimes that illustrate legislatures' intention to punish
inchoate, anticipatory, or "nonconsummated" 5 actions
of offenders, who betray their "subjective" (intended) as
opposed to "manifest" (actual, or harm-causing) crimi-
nality. 6
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Any homicide, however, not only requires a corpse,
but requires as well (sometimes imputed)17 conscious
excessive risk-taking and causality. Accordingly, if cer-
tain dangerous games are socially undesirable (and what
could be gained by them other than excessively risky
forms of self-indulgence?), then the solution is not to
stretch notions of causality or complicity all out of shape
(as we tend to do), but to legislatively increase the ex-
pected punishment costs for the lucky participants. 8
Currently the legislatively imposed expected punish-
ment costs to dangerous-game players are jarringly low.
For example, California's massive Vehicle Code, which
in its abridged edition spans 250 pages of microprint,
nowhere mentions drag racing, but it does punish with a
maximum $500 fine an infraction committed by (even
recidivist) drivers who exceed 100 miles per hour. 9 For
the protection of society, these speedy drivers may get
their licenses suspended. So too, is the Model Penal
Code's catch-all risk-prevention provision-reckless
endangerment-a mere misdemeanor.2' In fact, not only
is playing Russian roulette noncriminal, but the game is
played so that, according to at least one court, lucky
players never gain sufficient control over the weapon to
be convicted even of "carrying a firearm. "21
Thus if the social evil in dangerous games is that too
frequently they are fatal, then we should at the very
least criminalize the underlying activity and consider
increasing the sentences for the survivors of already
criminalized activity-whether or not a death occurs-
though it would be ludicrous to punish them more se-
verely than, or even as severely as, the unlucky partici-
pants. After all, when death does occur, the survivor
has a ready (if only partial) excuse, which should send
him "out of the fire into the frying pan--but still, of
course, any frying pan in a fire."22 The survivor's partial
excuse? He was lucky; he was "good"; he killed no one.
The 50 or so appellate cases on point, however, are all
over the lot. When they hold the lucky accountable, they
do so via one of two equally motley doctrinal strategies:
(1) lucky survivors are the proximate cause of deaths
that result from the game; or (2) lucky survivors are
complicit in or accomplices to the fatality. Neither theory
of description accurately assesses a lucky survivor's role
in unfortunate fatalities. The purpose of this essay,
therefore, is to put a stop to the muling of these two
doctrines in dangerous-game cases.
II Dangerous Games and Causality
What we do in the world depends on the world as well as on us. 23
First let me make clear what is and is not a "game" and
why it matters. The distinction matters because it is the
competition that makes plausible (though merely plausible
in my view) the claim that a lucky risk-taker can be blamed
for the acts of an unlucky risk-taker. For example, imag-
ine two people in separate rooms, houses, or even cities,
each unaware of the other. Were each to put a bullet in a
gun, spin the chamber, and pull the trigger, no one would
say that, were one to live and the other to die, the lucky
survivor is in any way responsible for the actions of the
unlucky deceased. So too, were two drivers to
speed-coincidentally, not in concert-it would be non-
sense to say that the speeder who avoids running over a
pedestrian can be blamed for the actions of the speeder
who runs over a pedestrian. If not for the pressures and
coordination of competition (or "concerted activity," if
you will)-for the fact that one player acts because, not
despite the fact that, another player acts--then we would
have even less than we do on which to base the lucky
player's liability for the acts of the unlucky player.
Accordingly, autoerotic asphyxiation is not a game
because it is masturbatory, and so tends to be performed
in solitude.24 Nor is drug- or alcohol-ingestion a game,
given that even in group settings intoxication is funda-
mentally social, not competitive, and is directed at eu-
phoria or self-forgetfulness, the risks of which are but
externalities of the activity. While admittedly in ordi-
nary language we do refer to solitaire as a "game," I
think it is fair to say that the dangerous games that
concern the criminal law are inherently competitive and
take at least two willing players, each of whom assumes
the risk that he will kill himself.2'.
Commonwealth v. Malone,26 for example, is not a dan-
gerous-game case because only Malone was playing.
He put a gun to his thirteen-year-old "friend's" ribs and
pulled the trigger three times. On the third pull the five-
chamber gun discharged, and after the apparently re-
morseful Malone apologized ("Gee kid, I'm sorry"),
his friend died. Malone's defense was that he had posi-
tioned the single bullet so that the gun would not fire
Criminal Justice Ethics
Dangerous Games and the Criminal Law / 5
until the fifth pull on the trigger. He was wrong. By the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's calculation, the prob-
ability of death (regardless of where Malone thought the
bullet was) made him a murderer. Because Malone's
life was never in danger, there was no game because he
had rigged the activity to place only the deceased at
risk.21
Currently the legislatively imposed
expected punishment costs to dangerous-
game players are jarringly low.
Driving too fast is not a game, unless flirting with the
possibility of apprehension by police is what we mean
by "game." 29 Drag racing, however, is a game. James
Dean drag raced in Nicholas Ray's Rebel Without a Cause
(1956). The foolhardiness of the activity was not lost on
Dean when he faced his adversary "Buzz" before the
race, with Dean's aversion to being called "chicken," the
devotion of Natalie Wood, and the avoidance of bore-
dom at stake. After rejecting his father's wimpy waf-
fling in response to Dean's question whether Dean should
"do this thing that was ... very dangerous, but it was a
matter of honor and you had to prove it," Dean was
confronted by Buzz at the bluff for a deadly game of
"chickie." The rules laid down by Buzz were clear: "She
[Natalie Wood] signals; we head for the edge and the
first man who jumps is a chicken, alright?" Though he
willingly participated, Dean felt agent-regret (as he
should-he is only human) when Buzz's car dropped
"over the edge" to "the end" when his sleeve got caught
on the door handle, preventing his timely bailing out of
his car.
If we want the criminal law to force the young, the
bored (boredom is said to explain author Graham
Greene's "youthful experiments" with Russian rou-
lette),30 the idle, the conflicted, and the macho to fore-
close on director Ray's brand of quasi-nihilism in favor
of more productive activities, then there must be a better
way of doing so than by saying that Dean and others
similarly situated somehow "killed" Buzz and his ana-
logues. But the law sees this quite obvious point far too
erratically to avoid critique. If I understand Professor
Crocker on this point, he would say Dean did kill Buzz
on the rather odd ground that because the rules of the
game were obeyed, Dean assumed risks not only to
himself, but to all others who played fairly,31 or, for
Professor Dressler, who concurs with Crocker, to all
others who did not "'ad lib.'"
32
That position on the issue of causality in drag-racing
cases is stated in the dissenting opinion (in favor of
liability) in Commonwealth v. Root:3
The race, the attempt to pass the other car and forge ahead,
the reckless speed, all of these factors the defendant himself
helped create .... That the victim's response was normal
under the circumstances, that his reaction should have been
expected ... is to me beyond argument. That the
defendant's recklessness was a substantial factor is obvious.
All of this ... makes his unlawful conduct a direct cause of
the resulting collision.3 4
The majority, contrariwise, ruled against liability on the
part of the lucky player:
[T]he deceased was aware of the dangerous condition
created by the defendant's reckless conduct in driving his
automobile at an excessive rate of speed along the highway
but, despite such knowledge, he recklessly chose to swerve
his car to the left and into the path of an oncoming truck,
thereby bringing about the head-on collision which caused
his own death .... [T]he defendant's reckless conduct was
not a sufficiently direct cause of the competing driver's death
to make him criminally liable therefor. 35
Borrowing from the Root dissent, the Iowa Supreme
Court later ruled in State v. McFadden 6 that a "sufficient
causal relationship" is good enough for tort and criminal
regimes. In McFadden, Sulgrove, McFadden's unlucky
opponent, "lost control of his automobile and swerved
into a lane of oncoming traffic, where he struck a law-
fully operated northbound vehicle... [that] contained a
six-year-old passenger, Faith Ellis, who was killed in the
collision along with Sulgrove." 37 McFadden's convic-
tion on two counts of manslaughter was affirmed.
McFadden not only botched its holding, but by launch-
ing into a lengthy and unhelpful discourse on causation,
that court, much like the court in Root (and far too many
others), failed to engage the real issue. For example,
McFadden relies on a passage from another drag-racing
case, Commonwealth v. Peak,38 which is a clear and high
example of how dangerous-game cases invoke descrip-
tions of causality that are simply false to the way we
(should) think about homicide:
Defendants, by participating in the unlawful racing, initiated
a series of events resulting in the death of Young. Under
these circumstances, decedent's own unlawful conduct does
not absolve defendants from their guilt. The acts of defen-
dants were contributing and substantial factors in bringing
about the death of Young. The acts and omissions of two or
more persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause
of an injury and in such a case each of the participating acts
or omissions is regarded in law as a proximate cause.39
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This may be hornbook law in tort' or criminal law,a" but
the real issue gets lost in this legalese, which is made no
better by the heralded 2 Model Penal Code, which ex-
cludes from its causal reach only the "too remote or
accidental."43 Given that, unlike moral blameworthi-
ness (of which Peak had plenty), causation is a substan-
tially mechanistic, not normative concept, the real issue
is whether the lucky Pea in any meaningful sense of the
word "killed" the unlucky Young, which he did not.
Thus the Root majority was definitely onto something
in acquitting the lucky Root, but the opinion is need-
lessly distracted by the ineptitude of the deceased.
Whether Root would have been decided identically had
the deceased been a better racer and killed another driver,
passenger, or pedestrian who lawfully crossed paths
with the racers is unclear. In other words, I am unsure
whether Root depends on essential differences between
tort and criminal notions of causation by identifying a
too fine-grained distinction between "direct" and "sub-
stantial" contributions to outcomes, or whether it was
condemning the deceased for being an unskilled racer
who did only himself in. Again, put slightly differently,
would Root have come out the same way had a nonpar-
ticipant gotten killed? And what if the unlucky or inept
player also had gotten killed, leaving us with "no body
to kick; no soul to damn"?'
Foggy if not meaningless distinctions
between but-for, direct, proximate,
substantial-factor, and concurrent
causation pervade the law.
The dangerous-games cases reveal that the death of a
nonparticipant is by no means uniformly viewed as a
particularly salient fact.45 For example, in State v.
Shimon,46 two teenagers, Johnson and Shimon, were drag
racing at speeds over 100 miles per hour when Johnson's
car spun out control, twice sideswiped Shimon's car,
killing neither driver nor either of Shimon's passengers,
but killing both of Johnson's passengers, whom the Iowa
Supreme Court said were killed as much by Shimon as
by Johnson. Its reasoning? The doctrine of "concurrent
causation" refuses to "shield ... a wrongdoer" unless
the "intervening cause" (Johnson's bad driving) "were
the sole proximate cause of the accident," which, due to
Shimon's "joint participation," it was not.47
A California case was equally indifferent to the role of
luck or contingency when it concluded that the deceased
(Sena)-a presumably law-abiding driver-was killed
after his car burst into flames when struck by the un-
lucky racer (Turner) into whose lane Sena had crept at
ten miles per hour. The lucky racer (Attebery), also a
named defendant in this wrongful-death suit, was, one
would think to his benefit, driving a slower car three or
four car lengths behind Turner when Sena's car appeared
on the scene. Attebery, zooming along at over 80 miles
per hour, managed "to drive through the flames be-
tween the two automobiles and escaped colliding with
either"48 before stopping about 200 feet down the road,
apparently by slamming into a street sign. The Court's
refusal to relieve Attebery on causal grounds was, to say
the least, quick: Attebery's claim that his conduct "was
not a proximate cause of the collision .... is clearly
devoid of merit, since there was evidence that the race
was in progress immediately prior to the time of impact
and this factor alone could constitute proximate causa-
tion."4 9 The court did not elaborate.
That Attebery's was a civil case is, or at least should
be, inconsequential. Foggy if not meaningless distinc-
tions between but-for, direct, proximate, substantial-fac-
tor, and concurrent causation pervade the law, despite
the capital invested (that fails to repay even the most
attentive reader) in identifying a sense of "cause" that
will do for torts, but is too broad for crimes."0 Indeed,
many of the dangerous-game cases I found were civil
actions," often, as with Attebery's, tort suits brought by
the loved ones of the unlucky,-2 or contract suits brought
by beneficiaries against the insurer of the unlucky. 3
Despite civil law's inability to tell us a thing about blame,
and despite the criminal law's blame-orientation (which
makes no claim to return plaintiffs to status quo ante), the
civil cases are equally instructive on causality, a concept
that cannot lightly carry an ordinary (tort) and special
(criminal) sense: not without more explanatory power
than I have seen in the statutes, 4 cases,5 jury instruc-
tions, 6 or academic commentary. 7
So was Root-which absolved the lucky or deft drag
racer of blame-at bottom a case about an (opaque)
special sense of causality reserved for the criminal law,
or was it about the role of luck, that is, lack-of-causation-
as-excuse? Or, as at least one court gleaned from it, was
Root about the role of skill: actions and their consequences
over which the agent has "control"?
Although due to countless contingencies all we really
can control in the world is our intentions, 8 "control"
over outcomes does make a difference to blame in the
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law's eyes. Shortly after Root, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court upheld James Atencio's conviction for the
manslaughter of Stewart Britch, with whom Atencio
played Russian roulette (along with one Marshall, who
was also convicted). Oddly, were Atencio a civil suit, the
court would have dismissed it on the ground that the
deceased's act of putting a loaded gun to his head and
firing it was an intervening, causal-chain-breaking, vol-
untary act.5 9 But somehow the criminal posture of the
case gave "the Commonwealth ... an interest that the
deceased should not be killed by the wanton or reckless
conduct of himself and others .... ,60 To bolster its
conclusion, the court insisted that this was "one 'game'
of Russian roulette": not "three 'games' of solitaire." 6'
From there Atencio turned to the highly relevant if not
dispositive role of skill in certain dangerous games, a
distinction we are told may support nonliability (as in
Root), as opposed to games in which the players give
themselves over to luck, where winners do nothing to
deserve credit or praise for outcomes, but get loads of
blame if things turn out unexpectedly badly.62
Atencio may be a nominally adequate defense of the
lawfulness of skydiving, boxing, and the Indianapolis
500, but (1) it flunks any sensible test of causality in
homicide prosecutions; and (2) its luck/skill dichotomy
is flatly counterintuitive.'
Causality in tort or crime is not a "policy" decision
(though in hard cases it can be treated as one); in the core
cases it is an assessment of the mechanics of human
action. Accordingly, unless a player in these cases runs
over, crashes into, or shoots a victim, he has not, except
in the most etiolat4.-nse of the word, "killed" anyone.
Moreover, unless a player pushes, bumps, nudges, tricks,
or coerces the killer into playing and killing either the
killer or someone else, we cannot fairly attribute the
killer's act to a mere player.64
As for the luck/skill dichotomy, drag racing is in a
sense based on power-it conscripts the unwilling-law-
abiding drivers, (some) recalcitrant passengers, and
pedestrians-to take chances with the players. Because
the chances the racers take endanger those who lack
interest in sharing the adventure, the racers are by no
means free from morality-from condemnation for un-
toward outcomes visited on the unwilling. If the anal-
ogy is apt, and I am not sure that it is, each Russian
roulette player takes chances that are, like an artist's,
65
truly his own, and are shared only by those who have
accepted contingency for themselves.66 Thus, assuming
as I do that Russian roulette rarely if ever kills the
"wrong" person (that is, someone other than the shooter),
these so-called "luck"-based games--like the new ado-
lescent obsession with "elevator surfing" 67-- whose risks
are shared only by the invited, should cut, if anywhere,
against, not toward, liability.
III Dangerous Games and Complicity
Having "resolved" the causal question, the Atencio case
devolved into a pastiche of mis-statements ab6ut the
law of complicity, which is the second doctrinal basis by
which lucky (or skilled, if you think it makes a differ-
ence) players in dangerous games are held criminally
liable for the deaths of unlucky co-participants, passen-
gers, law-abiding drivers, or bystanders.69 Under such a
theory of complicity we dub the lucky survivor what the
law calls an "accessory," "accomplice," "aider and abet-
tor," or "secondary party" to the homicide. Simply
stated, the law of complicity treats someone who helps
someone else commit a crime as though the helper him-
self committed the crime. If the "principal," "perpetra-
tor," or "doer" commits a crime, then equal blame goes
to the helper as well, provided that the crime which
occurs is one the helper knew about and whose success
the helper intended when he provided his encourage-
ment or assistance.70
"Causal" is a popular but specious way of describing
the helper's relation to the principal. Certainly one can
perform an action by getting others to perform it. "We
say, for example, 'Louis XIV built Versailles,' even though
the actual construction was not done by him."71 Indeed,
we can think of cases in which the principal is not a
principal at all, but is simply, perhaps metaphorically, a
tool, instrument, or means of someone else, such as
when the helper recruits a lunatic or a child to do the
deed. But those cases involve, or should involve, such
coercion or manipulation that the would-be principal's
act is fishy enough to be called "nonresponsible" or
"nonspontaneous." For another's action to be mine, I
must act in a way that shows that I see it as such; it
would be ungrammatical to say someone could "use"
someone else inadvertently. Were, I, for example, to pay
you to paint my house, it is not as though I see myself
painting the house-I see you doing it. The only evi-
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dence of my seeing myself doing it would be my placing
such constraints on your autonomy, or my knowingly
exploiting your ex ante lack of autonomy, that it ceases to
be your spontaneous act. Thus if I were to force or even
gently ask my young son to paint my house, then I have
painted my house through my son. I likewise would act
through you were I to hand you a package into which I
have secretly put a bomb for delivery to a victim I have
in mind, or were I to place you under duress by threat-
ening you with a greater harm if you do not act on my
behalf than if you do.72
There is nothing in well-settled principles
of complicity that can reach the lucky
survivors of dangerous games.
But while in garden-variety cases of complicity the
relation between the parties is nothing like that, a host of
leading commentators73 see a "sort" of causal contribu-
tion as the essence of helping. Their view justifies treat-
ing dangerous-game cases as instances of complicity on
the part of lucky survivors. Professor Kadish has spe-
cifically resisted doing so in dangerous-game cases, but
on the ground that the lucky participant's attitude to-
ward the harm is usually too dilute or indifferent and as
such lacks the intentionality toward untoward outcomes
that complicity doctrinally requires."
Yet not only are garden-variety complicity cases un-
able to carry the heavy normative load with which courts
and commentators have burdened the separating of con-
ditions from causes, but there is nothing in well-settled
principles of complicity that can reach the lucky survi-
vors of dangerous games. Nevertheless, it was on a
theory of complicity that Atencio and Marshall were
held liable as the manslaughterers of Britch (who shot
himself in the head). In a somewhat unsophisticated
account of complicity, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
explained:
There could be found to be a mutual encouragement in a joint
enterprise .... [T]here may have been no duty on the defen-
dants to prevent the deceased from playing. But there was a
duty on their part not to cooperate or join with him in the
"game." Nor, if the facts presented such a case, would we have
to agree that if the deceased, and not the defendants, had
played first that they could not have been found guilty of
manslaughter. The defendants were much more than merely
present at a crime. It would not be necessary that the defen-
dants force the deceased to play or suggest that he play.'s
Even if we could distinguish games that require skill or
judgment from luck-based games (and where would,
say, gambling, fall on this spectrum, were it to matter?),
the passage quoted above not only is a spurious inter-
pretation of the operation of complicity in Russian rou-
lette cases, but has been extended to drag racing as well,
which we are told is a game of "skill."
For example, in Jacobs v. State,76 Jacobs was one of
three racers on a two-lane highway. He led Kinchen and
Carter in teir proper lanes, all three at excessive speeds.
Kinchen decided to pass Carter at the crest of a hill by
pulling into the left lane, where he crashed head-on into
a lawfully operated car, thereby killing himself and the
other driver, William Buck. The wrinkle there was that
Jacobs was a quarter mile ahead of his co-participants
when the crash occurred. Again, complicity was the
basis of Jacobs's conviction. The supporting language
from the Florida appellate court should be by now fa-
miliar: "The deaths which proximately resulted from
the activities of the three persons engaged in the unlaw-
ful activity of drag racing made each of the active par-
ticipants equally guilty of the criminal act which caused
the death of the innocent party."77
New York then piled on in People v. Abbott & Moon,78 a
case quite similar to Jacobs. Moon was drag racing with
Abbott, who killed Patricia Hammond and her two pas-
sengers, who had entered the intersection through which
Moon was racing at 80-85 and Abbott at over 90 miles
per hour at the time of the wreck. Although Moon was
driving like a maniac, he was lucky enough to avoid
contact. Abbott's liability was obvious. Moon's convic-
tion of criminally negligent homicide and reckless driv-
ing was upheld on appeal, again on the grounds of
complicity:
While Moon did not personally control Abbott's vehicle
which struck and killed the three victims, it could reasonably
be found that he "intentionally" aided Abbott in the unlaw-
ful use of the vehicle by participating in a high-speed race,
weaving in and out of traffic, and thus shared Abbott's
culpability.... Moon associated himself with the high-speed
race on a busy highway and took a part in it for nearly two
minutes over a distance in excess of one mile. Actually his
conduct made the race possible. He accepted Abbott's
challenge and shared in the venture. Without Moon's aid
Abbott could not have engaged in the high-speed race which
culminated in the tragedy.79
For this reading of complicity the New York appellate
court cited criminal-law guru Wayne LaFave, who has
conceded that such a view "has much to recommend it." '
Though this mode of reasoning about the complicity
of Atencio, Jacobs, and Moon in the fatalities that arose
Criminal Justice Ethics
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out of their excessive risk-taking may have an elemental
appeal (they are, after all, wrongdoers), it is analytically
impossible. Consider again the passage quoted above
from Abbott & Moon where the court observed: "Actu-
ally, [Moon's] conduct made the race possible.""' Indeed it
did, and this is precisely why each racer is analytically
precluded from helping or being complicit in the race. As
I have argued here on another occasion, "help can be
withheld, or it wouldn't be helping at all."8 2 In other
words, because the relation of helping (unlike doing or
perpetrating) to the ultimate harm is synthetic, not ana-
lytic, the actions of helping and doing are distinct and
should be so treated. 3 Thus if the crime analytically,
elementally, or definitionally requires two or more par-
ties, then the required parties cannot, merely by partici-
pating, possibly "help" an activity to which they are by
definition essential. Certainly a buyer does not help a
seller in an exchange transaction by paying for goods
any more than an unmarried person helps a bigamist by
marrying him or her, a betrothed couple help each other
get married by marrying, or someone helps someone
else kiss simply by kissing them.
Here I am not talking about cases of "joint principal-
ity," under which two parties divide the elements of an
Because the relation of helping (unlike
doing or perpetrating) to the ultimate
harm is synthetic, not analytic, the actions
of helping and doing are distinct and
should be so treated.
offense; for example, two parties rob when one commits
the assault and the other the larceny. Since both the
force or threat of force and the taking of property are
analytically, elementally, or definitionally necessary to
any robbery, neither party is helping robbery; both are
committing it. Oppositely, where the help of one party is
necessary only as an empirical or synthetic matter-that
is, where a helper does not fulfill a statutory definition
of a crime or one of its elements, but his actions happen to
be necessary for the crime to succeed on these facts, then
he is helping and not doing, regardless of how he may
characterize his own actions.
For example, that a getaway driver may be necessary
for a successful robbery must be observed to be known;
getaway drivers are not analytically necessary to rob-
bery. Consequently, getaway drivers are helpers, not
joint principals, regardless of how they may character-
ize their actions.84 This is a point that is lost not only on
courts, but also on Professor Fletcher, who, though he so
often is right, wrongly finds cases of joint principality
"[un]workable" because it is sometimes "virtually im-
possible to quantify the degree of causal contribution"
between, say, the person who supplies the murder
weapon and the person who pulls the trigger.85 There
may be some puzzling instances of joint principality, but
Fletcher's is not an instance of joint principality, let alone
a puzzling one. The one who pulls the trigger kills; the
supplier of the weapon helps.
Multi-party game cases, therefore, like exchange trans-
actions, do not instantiate helping by one whose partici-
pation is analytically a necessary condition of the crime
itself. This is not to say that drag racing and Russian
roulette foreclose on the doctrine of complicity. Despite
his well-intended (and mostly correct) dissent in Jacobs,
Judge Carroll parodizes the idea that spectators cheer-
ing on a drag race could be liable for helping the homi-
cide. 6 He may find the result absurd, but it happens to
be the law, and a sensible one at that. The gaps in Judge
Carroll's understanding of complicity could be filled by
a glance at well-known decisions like Wilcox v. Jeffrey
(where a magazine writer, for the purpose of writing
about the performance, "helped" Coleman Hawkins play
jazz illegally in the United Kingdom). 7 Cheering spec-
tators are helping drag racing (as Natalie Wood so en-
thusiastically did in Rebel), and thus are complicit in the
unlucky racer's demise. But a lucky drag racer who
avoids disaster "helps" nothing.
Though American law insists on treating helpers and
doers identically, the cheering spectators should have an
excuse, albeit partial: they were merely helping. Not
only is the lucky survivor helping nothing, but neither is
he jointly principal in the homicide, given that man-
slaughter has two elements: (1) excessive risk-taking
and (2) causing death. Manslaughter is not, analytically,
a two-or-more-party offense; nor is it divided into one
(you steer; I accelerate?) as obscene phone calling could
be were one person to dial and the other to speak ob-
scenely. Atencio, Jacobs, and Moon were charged with
manslaughter, not with playing Russian roulette
(Atencio), and drag racing (Jacobs and Moon). To use
their necessary participation as a means of describing
their role as that of helping the unlucky player's actions
papers over the grammatical (and in my view moral)
distinction between helping and doing.
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Conclusion
Dangerous-game cases are, like most violence, for the
young. They bespeak a mode of self-indulgence that
should excite our indignation whether the games mis-
fire or not. But homicide is in part a mechanistic, causal
world, and lack of causation should be a (partial) excuse
in such cases. Unfortunately, the criminal law takes an
all-or-none, catastrophic approach to excuses, which only
rarely sends the wrongdoer from the fire into the frying
pan: indeed, voluntary manslaughter and diminished
capacity are the only partial defenses I know of. As long
as causality matters, the lucky, the skillful, the blessed-
the survivors of dangerous games-should not be sub-
jected to tortured or special senses of causation that still
trade on the ordinary sense of the term.8" If risk matters,
then we should punish risk-takers as such, but only as
such.
Nor is the expressive function of punishment served
by doing violence to the already complex doctrine of
complicity (again, in my view a plea for partial excuse)
by conflating helping and doing, and by ignoring rel-
evant distinctions between analytic and synthetic rela-
tions to outcomes-outcomes that inform whether and
how one can live with oneself and with others.
Our gripe in dangerous-game cases, then, should be
with the all-or-nothing nature of to-convict-or-fully-ex-
cuse and with the legislative failure to express sufficiently
public indignation at the underlying behavior, with or
without the consummated harm: here, death. The solu-
tion is not, to be sure, to fake and override what it means
to cause or help untoward consequences, but to do what
could only please subjectiists--punish excessive risk tak-
ers qua excessive risk-takers, and not to convert them
through judi cial ju-jit-su into harm-causers.
A lucky player should be (and is, unless strangely
remorseless) thankful, -whether to God or providence or
whatever. Thankful for what? Thankful that he did not
become what he had in him, and was ready to become: a
killer of himself or another. What was within him was
not realized, and so he has avoided an outcome at the
level of action that would have irretrievably altered his
relation with the world.8" The distinction matters; it is,
oweable entirely to him or not, his excuse.
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